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Implicit bias and prejudice  
 
Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit 
biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative 
content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes 
- they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously' - we may not know that we 
harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are 
difficult to control, considerable work is required to prevent their influence. We here focus on the 
implications of these findings for epistemology. We first look at ways in which implicit biases 
thwart our knowledge seeking practices (sections 1 & 2). Then we set out putative epistemic 
benefits of implicit bias, before considering ways in which epistemic practices might be improved 
(section 3). Finally, we consider the distinctive challenges that the findings about implicit bias pose 
to us as philosophers, in the context of feminist philosophy in particular (section 4).  
 
1) Good epistemic practice 
Let us start by noting various hallmarks of good epistemic practice, as we find them in the 
epistemology literature, and the ways that implicit biases have been argued to thwart good 
epistemic practice. 
 
Implicit bias and distortion 
Central to the idea of good epistemic practice is the notion of standing in the right sort of relation 
to the world by tracking the truth in our belief formation and judgement: 
 
TRUTH-TRACKING: S's belief forming processes are in good epistemic standing if S’s 
belief formation tracks the truth.  
 
For example, suppose at a philosophy conference you form the belief that Jessica is an 
epistemologist. In order to meet the norm TRUTH-TRACKING you would only believe that Jessica 
is an epistemologist if it is true that she is; you track the way the world is.  
Suppose that we have reason to believe that our belief forming processes lead to systematic 
distortion of our beliefs and judgements. This would indicate that our belief forming processes do 
not meet norms such as TRUTH-TRACKING. Jennifer Saul argues that this is precisely what we 
should conclude from the findings about implicit bias. She claims that 'the research on implicit bias 
shows us that we are actually being affected by biases about social groups when we think we are 
evaluating evidence or methodology' (248). Her concern is that we systematically have our judgements 
and beliefs distorted by considerations of gender and race and other social identities. Since in the 
normal course of things, when evaluating evidence or methodology these considerations are not 
relevant to our enquiries: irrelevant considerations distort our judgements. Let us consider an 
example of the sort of thing Saul has in mind. 
 Imagine you are taking part in a psychological study, and your task is to evaluate the 
importance of traits that you find on the CV in front of you to the role for which individuals are 
applying (the role of police chief, say). If you are tracking the truth then you will form judgements 
based on the assessment of the relevance of the traits to the role at issue. Those judgements should 
be consistent across the CVs you look at: if you think that certain qualifications are very important 
when possessed by candidate A, but irrelevant when possessed by candidate B, then your 
assessment of the importance of those qualifications appears not to track the truth about which 
traits are really relevant to the role. 
 Yet, this is just the pattern of judgements that Ulhmann and Cohen (2007) found when they 
asked participants to make such evaluations. When considering the importance of being 
'streetwise' to being a police chief, participants tended to judge this as important when a male 
applicant possessed it, but not when a female applicant did.1 This led them to make more positive 
hiring recommendations for the male candidates, irrespective of their differing qualifications for 
the post. Ulhmann and Cohen conclude that implicit associations between men and police chief 
roles distorted individuals' clear-eyed evaluation of the importance of qualifying characteristics.  
To fully appreciate how people’s judgements violate the truth-tracking norm in their 
responses in this study, consider how they fail to meet some norms which have been taken by 
various epistemologists to capture what it is for an epistemic agent to track the truth: 
 
SENSITIVITY: S's belief that p is sensitive if and only if, if p were false, S would not believe 
that p (cf Nozick 1981)  
 
SAFETY: S’s belief that p is safe if and only if p could not easily have been false (Williamson 
2000, Pritchard 2005). 
 
Suppose that when evaluating the streetwise woman's CV you form the belief: (SW) being streetwise 
is not important to the role of police chief.  For the sake of argument, suppose it is true that it is not so 
important to the role. Does this belief track the truth? On one view, we ask: is this belief sensitive, 
or would you still believe it if it were false?  In these scenarios, where the only difference is the 
gender of the applicant but different responses are made, you seem not to be sensitive to the truth 
or falsity of the belief - you'd falsely believe it important if a man had that trait.  What about 
SAFETY? Is your belief unsafe: could your true belief easily have been false? It would seem so: 
even where your belief is true, it could have easily have been false: if you had formed your belief 
in a situation where the only difference were the gender of the applicant for the job, you may have 
reached a different belief about the weighting of the trait. If this is right, then it looks like these 
implicit associations lead people to occupy a poor epistemic situation, forming beliefs that are 
insensitive or unsafe, even when their beliefs are true.   
 
Implicit bias and perceptual evidence 
Consider another marker of good epistemic practice that epistemologists have identified: 
  
EVIDENCE: S's beliefs have positive epistemic status if (a) the believer has good supporting 
evidence for those beliefs and (b) the belief is based on that evidence. 
 
We might think that a paradigm case of having good supporting evidence for our beliefs is when 
we appeal to perceptual evidence under normal circumstances. Suppose you perceive that Jessica 
is at the conference and form the belief that she is in attendance. Unless you have reason to 
suppose your perceptual systems to be unreliable under the circumstances in which you perceived 
Jessica, your belief appears to be evidentially supported. However, some philosophers have 
worried that implicit biases sometimes pose problems even for our reliance on perception. Jennifer 
Saul (2013) and Susanna Siegel (2012) have each pointed to studies that indicate that implicit 
associations lead to distortion of our perceptual judgements. (One way of putting this worry might 
be that our biases 'cognitively penetrate' our perceptions (Siegel, 2012)).  
To see the worry, imagine that you are participating in an experiment in which you are 
asked to identify a picture of an object that is flashed before your eyes - a weapon, such as a gun, 
                                                          
1 Ulhmann and Cohen used certain experiences, by which the candidates were ranked, to indicate the extent to which 
a candidate was 'streetwise': e.g. 'worked in tough neighbourhoods', 'got along with other officers'. This was 
contrasted with qualifications pertaining to being well educated:'well schooled', 'with administrative experience'. 
or a non-harmful object, such as a tool. You might expect the perceptual judgements that you form 
to be solely determined by the evidence before you (shape of object, features manifest, etc.). 
However, Keith Payne's (2006) study showed that whether a picture of a black or white male's face 
was flashed before the picture of the object made a significant difference to individuals' perceptual 
judgements. If you are primed to think about black persons, you are more likely to perceive that 
the object is a weapon. This means that the presence of a prime can determine the way the object is 
perceived. These findings suggest that implicit bias ‘affects our very perceptions of the world’ 
(Saul 2013, 246), preventing our perceptions from being fully determined by the relevant evidence 
available in our environments.    
 
Implicit bias and internalist justification 
A further norm of good epistemic practice that some epistemologists advocate is the following:  
 
ACCESSIBILITY: S's belief that p is justified if and only if S has access to good, undefeated 
and consciously accessible reasons for believing p. 
 
Those who endorse this norm argue that factors that are under the radar of consciousness are 
irrelevant to the justificatory status of a belief: they can neither justify nor defeat the justification of 
a belief.  
  But now imagine again that you are taking part in the CV study, or Payne's object 
perception study. Notwithstanding the impact of biases that we have outlined above, it may 
nonetheless seem, from your own perspective, that you have access to good reasons for your belief 
- your perceptions of the object, for example. Moreover, the influence of implicit bias on perception 
may operate under the radar of consciousness: therefore it is irrelevant to the justification of your 
beliefs according to ACCESSIBILITY. According to this norm, you have justified beliefs, although 
your beliefs are affected by implicit biases (Puddifoot 2015).  
 These observations pose difficulties for those who endorse ACCESSIBILITY. There is a 
strong case for saying that where you form a belief based on bias-inflected perceptions your belief 
does not conform to the norms of good epistemic practice. But this cannot be captured by the norm 
ACCESSIBILITY (ibid.). Although firmly committed accessibilists might bite this bullet, this 
commits them to accepting that their account cannot capture the various ways that implicit biases 
lead people to deviate from good epistemic practice.  
  
Implicit biases, responsibility and virtues 
Some epistemologists have emphasised that good epistemic practice involves forming beliefs 
responsibly, giving priority to the following norm: 
 
RESPONSIBILITY: good epistemic practice requires forming beliefs responsibly, in a way 
that fits with the evidence, coheres with one’s previous beliefs, and is based on good 
reasons (Bonjour 1985, Kornblith 1983).  
 
From what we’ve already seen – the CV example and the weapons bias case – implicit biases pose 
difficulties for forming beliefs responsibly: biases prevent us from responding to the evidence that 
is available to us and from being aware of the real reasons for our beliefs. A subset of 
epistemologists who place responsibility at the heart of their account of good epistemic practice 
are virtue responsibilists, who give priority to norms such as the following: 
 
VIRTUE: good epistemic agents exercise a suite of epistemic virtues, including intellectual 
carefulness, perseverance, flexibility, open-mindedness, fair-mindedness and insightfulness 
(Zagzebski 1996, 155).  
 
VICE AVOIDANCE: good epistemic agents avoid the exercise of a suite of epistemic vices, 
including intellectual pride, negligence, conformity, rigidity, prejudice, closed-mindedness 
and lack of thoroughness (Zagzebski 1996, 152).  
 
Psychologists have emphasised that implicit biases function in the service of efficiency (see 
Moskowitz and Li 2011): these sorts of automatic processes are useful to us when we're under time 
pressure, or preoccupied with other tasks. But whilst this arguably might sometimes be useful (see 
section 3), it is in tension with intellectual virtues such as carefulness, flexibility, and perseverance. 
The person whose beliefs and judgements are influenced by implicit bias displays epistemic vices 
like negligence and lack of thoroughness. And since implicit biases often encode stereotypes, they 
are a hindrance to the achievement of virtues such as open-mindedness, leading to prejudice and 
closed-minded responses. Note that in some circumstances – e.g. of limited evidence of social 
equality or in which little is known about implicit bias – agents might demonstrate these vices 
even whilst doing all they can to live up to their epistemic responsibilities. This may be a case of 
what Fricker (2016) calls 'no fault' epistemic responsibility: non-culpable epistemic responsibility 
for a biased response even whilst it is unreasonable to expect her to have avoided it.  Implicit 
biases therefore make both VIRTUE and VICE AVOIDANCE difficult to achieve, even for those 
who make substantial efforts to meet these norms. 
 
Implicit bias and appropriate trust 
Finally, consider the dispositions involved in responding appropriately to testimonial evidence.  
Elizabeth Fricker (1995) endorses: 
 
TRUST: good epistemic agents should adopt an appropriately critical stance towards the 
testimony of others (Fricker 1995). 
 
For example, imagine you tell me that Jessica was at the conference in May. According to TRUST, I 
should adopt the appropriately critical stance, using markers of credibility to evaluate whether 
your testimony has evidential value, before trusting (or not) your testimony about Jessica's 
whereabouts.  
 As Patricia Hill Collins argued, decisions about 'whom to trust and what to believe' are key 
to what version of the truth will prevail. And such decisions have often been guided by sexist and 
racist assumptions (2010, 252). Stereotypes that reduce black women's credibility have been used 
to disregard black women's testimony and exclude them from the domain of knowers (254, see 
also 69-97). More recently, Miranda Fricker (2007) has elucidated the way prejudice can inflect 
trust in her development of the idea of 'testimonial injustice'. Fricker describes how judgements 
about whether a source of testimony is credible can rely on negative prejudices that track social 
identity, such as gender or race.  Fricker illustrates this with the example from The Talented Mr 
Ripley: Dickie Greenleaf’s girlfriend Marge has valuable testimonial evidence about the 
circumstances of his disappearance, but she is written off as proffering merely 'women's intuition', 
and as being unreliable due to her distress. Knowledge is lost as she is excluded from the domain 
of knowers. More generally, TRUST is unlikely to be met in interactions with members of 
stigmatized groups stereotyped as epistemically inferior in this way: a default position of 
suspicion which fails to track true markers of credibility may be manifest and an inappropriately 
critical stance adopted in assessing the testimony of members of such groups.  
 We might think that so long as we are free from the sorts of prejudices that beset the agents 
in Mr Ripley - outright, or paternalistic, sexism - we are not hindered in our development of 
appropriate dispositions of trust. But implicit biases might be implicated in our dispositions to 
trust in complex ways. Some autonomic responses may subtly inflect our interactions in a way that 
undermines TRUST. For example, Dovidio et al (1997) found differences in the automatic aspects 
of behaviour of white participants towards black and white interaction partners. In interactions 
with black partners, white participants' rates of eye-blink, which reflects tension, were higher; and 
rates of eye-contact, reflecting intimacy and respect, were lower. Interestingly, since the white 
individuals were not readily aware of these aspects of their behaviour, this also led to divergent 
impressions of how pleasant the interactions were: the black participants noted the signals of 
discomfort, whilst the white participants were not aware they were displaying such behaviour 
(Dovidio et al 2002). The tension that besets, and discrepant impressions of these interactions, 
Dovidio et al claim, means that these automatic behaviours operate 'in a way that interfere[s] with 
a foundation of communication and trust that is critical to developing long-term positive 
intergroup relations' (89). Kristie Dotson (2011) characterises such micro-behaviours as ways in 
which hearers demonstrate 'testimonial incompetence' and fail to provide the appropriate uptake 
for the testimony. Having these biases hinders interlocutors in meeting norms of TRUST and 
important testimonial evidence may be lost (cf Fricker 2007).  
 
Implicit bias, exclusion and epistemic practice 
It is worth noting that in various endeavours to address under-representation it has been argued 
that implicit biases are part of the (complex) explanations for continued marginalisation and 
exclusion of individuals - in particular women and black and minority ethnicity individuals - from 
communities of enquirers (Saul 2013). If this is so, then on views according to which diverse 
communities of enquirers are better positioned to identify errors and biases, implicit biases will be 
doubly implicated in undermining good epistemic practice: first in distorting the judgement of 
individuals; secondly in sustaining a homogeneous community of enquirers in which those 
distortions cannot well be detected and corrected (cf Longino's model of enquiry, 1990). 
 
Implicit bias and scepticism 
 We might wonder how widespread are the difficulties we have outlined. Saul (2013) argues that 
these findings mean that we have strong reasons not to trust our own 'cognitive instruments' (to 
use Hookway's (2010) terminology). Very many of our judgements may be distorted by implicit 
biases and the chances of detecting and correcting all of these are slim. We may never be sure, Saul 
argues, that we are forming good judgements - especially if perception itself is subject to 
distortion, and especially if we can't even detect the occasions on which we are getting things 
wrong. This sort of 'bias-induced doubt', Saul claims, is more pressing than that induced by more 
traditional sceptical challenges: we have strong reason to suppose that the challenge is realised 
(rather than just a theoretical possibility, such as that we are brains in vats); and, the scope of the 
challenge is broad - it would undermine very many of our judgements and beliefs (rather than  
some subset of them, as may be the case if we learn we have reason to doubt our probabilistic 
reasoning). Moreover, it is not clear that this kind of doubt can be overcome by individual 
exercises of reasoning; social resources may be required to mitigate bias-related doubt (see section 
3 below). As such, the phenomenon of implicit bias should lead us to a radical form of scepticism. 
 One of the premises that provides the basis for the move to pervasive bias-related doubt is 
that we cannot be sure whether we are affected by biases. Recently, though, contention has 
emerged regarding whether we can be aware of implicit biases: in part this might depend on the 
sense of awareness at issue (see Nagel 2014, Holroyd 2014). Recent empirical studies suggest that, 
at least under certain conditions, individuals can become aware that their behaviours manifest bias 
(Hahn 2013). If we are able to deploy strategies to reliably track this, the scope of the sceptical 
challenge could be somewhat limited, by helping us to be aware of those cases in which our 
judgements are indeed beset by biases.  However, the efficacy of those strategies needs further 
investigation. 
 Note that this line of scepticism supposes that implicit biases are always epistemically 
defective - leading us away from epistemic norms such as TRUTH-TRACKING, and hindering our 
cultivation of good dispositions such as VIRTUE, or TRUST. This stands in stark contrast to 
another line of reasoning, which has proposed that, whilst morally problematic, implicit biases 
might nonetheless yield some epistemic benefits.  
 
 
2) Epistemic benefits of implicit bias? 
Here we consider whether (a) there is a case for accepting that implicit biases can sometimes be 
epistemically beneficial; and (b) there are costs to strategies intended to reduce the influence of 
implicit bias. Given the claims of section 1, it may seem obvious that implicit biases are damaging 
and that it is epistemically beneficial rather than costly to reduce the influence of implicit bias. 
However, these assumptions have been challenged by, in turn, Jennifer Nagel (2012, 2014) and 
Tamar Szabo Gendler (2011).  
 
Benefits of implicit biases?  
Nagel (2014) disputes what she describes as a misinterpretation of empirical evidence that 
‘intuitive’ forms of thought - 'type 1', fast, automatic, implicit cognitions - are irrational and likely 
to lead to errors, in contrast to  ‘reflective’ - 'type 2', slow and deliberative - forms of thought, 
which are taken to be rational.2  
 Nagel defends intuitive reasoning in general - and indeed, there is no reason to suppose 
that all cognition that is non-reflective is therefore defective - but pertinent to our concerns is her 
defence of implicit biases in particular. The latter rests on empirical findings suggesting that 
implicit attitudes can be updated to reflect stimuli presented to the thinker. In an experimental 
setting, participants were exposed to pairings of black individuals with positive words and images 
and white individuals with negative words and images. Following exposure to these pairings 
some implicit associations altered, even in the absence of any change of their explicit attitudes 
(Olson and Fazio 2006, cited in Nagel 2012). These findings suggest that implicit biases may be as 
evidence sensitive as explicit attitudes. If this is correct, there is reason to think that implicit biases 
can be epistemically beneficial; that under some circumstances we are more likely to make 
accurate judgements that reflect the available evidence if we are influenced by implicit biases than 
if we are not so influenced. 
 However, in evaluating Nagel's claims, we should bear in mind the distinction between (i) 
individuals who hold implicit associations being responsive to evidence and (ii) implicit 
associations being responsive to evidence. The Olson and Fazio study suggests that implicit biases 
can be responsive to evidence, and that our associations can change due to exposure to stimuli. But 
in a way, this is unsurprising, since the associations are held by many psychologists to be the result 
of associations in our environment to which we are exposed. Moreover, that the associations may 
be responsive to stimuli does not show that people who hold and are influenced by such implicit 
associations are more responsive to evidence than they would be if they were not subject to biases. 
It is consistent with Fazio & Olson's claim that being influenced by implicit bias brings epistemic 
costs, leading to distorted judgements, and preventing us from forming beliefs based on the 
evidence. This is so even if the association itself can be altered through strategies such as counter-
stereotyping used in the Olson and Fazio study. 
                                                          
2 Ultimately, Nagel endorses a way of distinguishing intuitive and reflective thinking that identifies the ways each 
draws on working memory. Each depends on the other (228-231). See also Carruthers 2013. 
 
Epistemic costs of reducing bias? 
A distinct challenge is presented by Tamar Szabo Gendler,  (2011) who agrees that there are 
serious epistemic costs to being influenced by implicit bias, but argues that there are also epistemic 
costs to choosing not to be influenced by implicit bias. To so choose, Gendler argues, is to choose 
not to be influenced by social category information. For example, to avoid weapons bias of the sort 
described above, you could ignore social category information about high rates of crime among the 
Black population of the United States. The result of this choice would be that you would no longer 
more strongly associate the members of the social category group (e.g. Black people in the US) 
with the undesirable features (e.g. weapons, or crime) and you could avoid relying on implicit 
associations that you explicitly repudiate. However, Gendler argues, this choice involves the 
explicit irrationality of choosing base-rate neglect: the neglect of important and relevant 
background information (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Gendler's argument presents a dilemma 
between two epistemic aims:  between avoiding the epistemic costs of base-rate neglect, or 
avoiding the epistemic costs of the influence of implicit associations (though see Mugg 2013 for a 
rejection of the claim that there are epistemic costs of being biased to the bearer of the bias).  
 Another potential dilemma we may face is between ignoring base-rate information - an 
alleged epistemic cost - and utilising it - an alleged ethical cost, insofar as implicit biases lead to 
discriminatory differential treatment of members of groups targeted by the biases (see Kelly & 
Roedder 2008, Brownstein 2015, for articulation of the ethical/epistemic dilemma).  
 Either way of setting up the dilemma supposes that there are some epistemic costs to not 
utilising implicit biases, since doing so involves a form of base-rate neglect. Focusing on implicit 
bias relating Black people with violence or crime, Puddifoot (ms) challenges this claim, arguing 
that our ordinary ways of using social category information about race and crime that occur in the 
absence of strategies to prevent implicit bias are substantially different from ideal base-rate use: 
whilst ideal base-rate information use involves using accurate and relevant background 
information, our ordinary social category judgements involve inaccurate stereotypes, deploying 
them where they are irrelevant, and allowing them to distort our perception of, for example, case-
specific information about individual crimes, suspects or victims. Accordingly, preventing our 
judgements being influenced by social category information in order to change or remove implicit 
biases is not equivalent to ignoring useful information, and so does not involve the same epistemic 
cost as base-rate neglect.  
 Another response accepts that there is a dilemma, but argues that we can minimise the 
costs we face. Madva (2016) argues that if we can limit the influence of implicit associations on 
judgement and behaviour, we could use information about social reality only where appropriate. 
For example, implicit associations between black men and crime might influence our thought if we 
are aiming to understand the social forces that culminate to pressurise young black males into 
criminal activity without implicit associations (e.g. between black males and crime) then distorting 
judgement on other occasions. It is an open empirical question, however, whether and under what 
conditions it is possible to prevent our awareness of background information about social 
categories from inflecting our cognition with implicit biases. Further, the claim that it is possible to 
control implicit biases in this way will turn, ultimately, on debates concerning the nature of 
implicit bias (see Levy 2014, Mandlebaum 2015, Holroyd 2016) and the methods available to 
mitigate its influence. 
 
3) Improving epistemic practice  
Insofar as at least sometimes implicit biases hinder our epistemic practice then we should consider 
ways in which our epistemic practices might be adapted or transformed in order to avoid the 
distortions of implicit bias. The discussion above highlights that strategies for combating bias may 
be not only morally required, but also required if we are to avoid poor epistemic practice. 
However, there may be competing epistemic considerations that must be weighed in deciding 
what to do.  
 
Insulating from implicit bias  
One way in which we might avoid the epistemic distortions of implicit bias is by insulating our 
epistemic practices from the possibility of bias: deploying procedures to remove bias-triggering 
demographic information. For example, anonymised CVs can avoid gender or race biases 
inflecting the evaluation of the quality of the applicants, and could bring practice into line with 
norms of TRUTH-TRACKING, or EVIDENCE, and help agents with AVOIDING VICES. However, 
such anonymisation processes may also involve unwanted epistemic limitations. Suppose we 
know that women and black or minority ethnicity individuals receive significantly less mentoring 
in a particular profession. Knowledge of an applicant's race or gender, therefore, could help to 
contextualise some of the information provided on the CV, and to understand qualifications as 
achieved despite less mentoring. 
  
De-biasing 
Other strategies aim to remove the bias from our cognitions. This includes measures either to 
'retrain' associative thinking or affective responses to remove problematic biases; or to train other 
aspects of cognition to effectively manage and block the manifestation of bias. Studies have 
suggested a range of surprising measures may be effective, such as: imagining counter-
stereotypical exemplars (Dasgupta & Asgari 2004); imagining interactions with individuals from 
stigmatised racial groups (Crisp et al 2012); retraining approach/avoidance dispositions 
(Kawakami et al 2007), by way of retraining the associations. Or, to block the influence of bias 
measures found to have some success include imagining cases in which one has failed to act fairly, 
thereby activating 'egalitarian goals' (Moskowitz & Li, 2011), or deploying 'implementation 
intentions - cued cognitive or behavioural responses to environmental stimuli - (Sheeran, Webb & 
Pepper 2010). 
 Nagel (2014, 238) has raised concerns about the specific epistemic costs of some of these 
strategies: implementation intentions, she argues, generate a general loss of accuracy in object 
identification studies (the weapon/tool studies outlines above). The main general concern for such 
strategies, however (setting aside for now the issue of whether debiasing involves epistemic loss), 
are the epistemic difficulties in knowing how effective these debiasing strategies are. On the one 
hand, some studies have failed to replicate success in mitigating biases; on the other, even if the 
studies robustly demonstrate bias reduction, it can be difficult to generalise outside of the lab, or to 
other kinds of bias. Since biases are varied in content and, it seems, in operation, measures which 
are successful in combating one kind of bias may not be so for others (see Holroyd & Sweetman 
2016; Madva & Brownstein ms). For example, bias reduction strategies may aim to reduce certain 
stereotypical associations, such as those between black people and physical (rather than 
intellectual) constructs (cf Amodio & Devine 2006). Yet it is unlikely that this same bias is 
implicated in e.g. perceptions of greater hostility in black facial expressions (Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen 2007), or in weapons biases (Payne 2006) – for which different interventions may be 
required. 
 
Individualistic and interpersonal correctives 
Some have argued that individual virtues are an important corrective to combating the distortions 
of prejudice and implicit biases (see Webber 2016; Fricker 2007). For example, Miranda Fricker has 
proposed the virtue of 'testimonial justice' as required to avoid unjustly underestimating the 
credibility of interlocutors.  One way in which this sensibility may manifest, Fricker suggests 
(2010), is in alertness to cognitive dissonance between judgements of credibility (which may be 
infected by implicit biases) and the anti-discrimination norms to which one subscribes. Dissonance 
can provide 'cues for control' and prompt critical assessments of the evidence.  
 Note that this strategy supposes that individuals can at least sometimes become cognisant 
of their susceptibility to bias - arresting prejudicial tendencies when it is noticed that they are in 
operation.  Is such awareness possible? There are at least three senses of awareness at issue in the 
literatures of philosophy and psychology: introspective awareness of the associations; 
observational awareness of our behaviour being inflected by bias; inferential awareness of our 
propensity to bias given the empirical findings (Holroyd 2014). Notwithstanding obstacles to 
awareness such as self-deception or misleading introspective evidence, some recent studies 
suggest that whilst we are individually poor judges of the extent to which we have or manifest 
implicit biases, we are nonetheless better at noticing the effects of bias when prompted in 
interpersonal interactions to reflect on this (Hahn et al 2013).  
 Even if individuals are able to ascertain that their behaviours manifest bias, it is difficult to 
detect to what extent this is so. It is not the case that whenever we find implicit bias influencing 
belief, the counterfactual 'She would not believe that but for the bias' will be true: in some cases 
biases might shore up a belief, make it peculiarly insensitive to revision, but ultimately provide 
bad epistemic grounds for a belief that has independent epistemic support. So assessing the ways 
in which biases have affected our beliefs requires careful weighing of evidence with the likely 
contribution of bias: yet we are not often in an epistemic position to do this (for an example of the 
difficulties that beset attempts to 'correct' judgements which might be inflected by implicit bias, see 
Kelly & Roedder's (2008) discussion of grading student papers). 
 
Structural correctives 
Haslanger (2015) has suggested that if the correct analysis of injustice is primarily structural, then 
individual corrective responses are unlikely to effectively target injustice. Moreover, correcting 
individual implicit biases may be ineffective in the absence of broader social change: few de-
biasing strategies have lasting effects, as problematic associations remain in our social 
environment.  Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson has worried that if problems of improper credibility 
assignment are systemic and structural, then individual virtue as a corrective is unlikely to be 
sufficient to address the problem: not only because it can be hard to identify when such correctives 
are needed, and hard for individuals to be constantly vigilant to going wrong; but also because 
broader structural solutions are needed (2012, 167). 
 Anderson describes three ways structural change can be beneficial: first, enabling 
individual corrective measures to work - for example by having institutional procedures that 
clearly specify explicit grounds for decision-making, sufficient time for making decisions carefully 
in accordance with those criteria, and accountability for discriminatory outcomes (Anderson 2010, 
168). Second, structural changes can instantiate individual virtues at a collective level - an 
institution may endorse institutional policies that accord with the norm of TRUST or VIRTUE (168-
169). Finally, Anderson proposes a more radical kind of structural change: we might hope to foster 
social and structural arrangements that promulgate 'epistemic democracy: universal participation 
on terms of equality of all inquirers' (Anderson 2010, 172). This involves ending patterns of 
informal segregation that structure educational provision, and communities of inquiry.  
 
Avoiding scepticism? 
Given that epistemic difficulties beset the remedial strategies themselves - how effective they are, 
when they are needed, whether they can be successful in the absence of broader structural change - 
the threat of scepticism may remain until our social and epistemic environment is refigured along 
the lines of Anderson's 'epistemic democracy' (cf Saul 2013). An alternative response to bias-related 
scepticism has been proposed by Louise Antony (2016): confronted by the pervasiveness of bias, 
Antony suggests, we should not retreat to scepticism, but rather adopt a naturalised epistemology 
of inquiry based evaluation into which biases are a hindrance to good epistemic practice, and 
which are not. We may be unable to function bias free, but we can weed out the bad ones, and use 
methods of scientific enquiry to do so. 
 
4) Challenges for philosophers 
Finally, philosophical engagement with empirical research on implicit bias raises distinctive 
epistemic challenges.  
 
Repligate 
The discipline of social psychology is itself presently facing a crisis of replication - so called 
'repligate'. In a wide-ranging attempt to replicate important findings, only 39 of 100 studies 
reproduced the original results,3 prompting critical reflection on the methods of empirical 
psychology: whether null results should be published, data widely and openly available, methods 
and analyses pre-registered to avoid selective analysis and so on. We are not suggesting that this 
provides decisive reason to doubt all of the findings of empirical psychology - especially since 
some findings have been replicated via robust methods. However, there is reason to adjust our 
confidence in the outcomes of empirical studies until they have been robustly replicated. And 
whilst a large number of studies have demonstrated the existence and effects of implicit bias (see 
Jost 2009), attempts to mitigate bias have been less successfully replicated (Lai et al 2014).  
 
Under-developed conceptual frameworks 
A second difficulty is that the psychological research deploys notions that are constructed with 
experimental purpose, rather than philosophical rigour, in mind. Most simply, psychologists may 
use terminology ('belief', 'judgement', 'stereotype', 'desire', 'affect') in different ways from 
philosophers. More problematically, philosophers may inherit modes of discourse - 'implicit bias' 
itself being a case in point - that is not robustly worked out. Few psychologists agree on what is 
meant by 'implicit', and some understandings of it - e.g. accessible (though not exclusively) by 
implicit measure (DeHouwer 2009) - certainly depart from what is commonly meant in 
philosophical discourse (where this is often conflated with 'unconscious'). These differences are not 
benign - normative conclusions to do with accountability and remedial obligation may turn on the 
sense in which biases are 'implicit', and whether this is incompatible with 'awareness' (see Holroyd 
2014).  
 This means that there is scope for what philosophers may sometimes do best - bringing 
conceptual clarity to a discourse! But whilst the empirical evidence is fast changing, it may be 
difficult to reach firm conclusions. We take this to speak in favour of more, rather than less, 
interaction between philosophers and psychologists - to enable fruitful and conceptually clear 
discourse across disciplinary differences. 
 
Positioning the literature in relation to extant claims 
The findings of empirical psychology are often presented as showing to us surprising and 
troubling aspects of our cognitions, and their implication in perpetuating injustices.  But we should 
ask why these findings are surprising, and what this tells us about our epistemic disposition 
towards sources of evidence.  One putative and unsatisfactory answer would be that empirical 
                                                          
3 See Open Science Collaboration (2015), DOI: 10.1126/science.aac4716; however, it is worth considering 
http://alexanderetz.com/2015/08/30/the-bayesian-reproducibility-project/ [accessed 13.01.2016]for useful critical 
discussion of how to interpret these failures of replication. 
psychology reveals a domain of discriminatory behaviour which it was simply impossible to know 
about prior to the advent of the this research. This answer is unsatisfactory in that in supposing 
knowledge of such discrimination was inaccessible to us, we fail to engage with other sources of 
evidence of these patterns of discrimination and ignore testimonial evidence from individuals 
stigmatised by such biases. Gloria Yamato provides such testimonial evidence, in her writing from 
1988, which pre-dates the recent upsurge of interest in implicit bias within psychology and 
philosophy: 
 
Unaware/unintentional racism drives usually tranquil white liberals wild when they get 
called on it, and confirms the suspicions of many people of color who feel that white folks 
are just plain crazy. [...] With the best of intentions, the best of educations, and the greatest 
generosity of heart, whites, operating on the misinformation fed to them from day one, will 
behave in ways that are racist, will perpetuate racism by being "nice" the way we're taught 
to be nice (Yamato, 2004, p.100).4  
 
The point is not that empirical psychology adds nothing to our understanding of patterns of 
discrimination - of course it has helped us to develop nuanced models of how aspects of our 
cognition may be implicated in, and perpetuate, various injustices. But we should not suppose that 
it reveals patterns of discrimination that were invisible prior to this; to do so privileges certain 
sources of evidence - from communities of academic scientists - over others, namely, the testimony 
of individuals targeted by those patterns of discrimination and injustice. Indeed, the value of lived 
experience as a source of knowledge has been emphasised by Patricia Hill Collins. She suggests 
that within black feminist thought lived experience reveals itself as a more reliable source of 
understanding than those produced by exclusionary institutions, quoting Hannah Nelson's remark 
that for her, 'distant statistics are certainly not as important as the actual experience of a sober 
person' (Nelson, quoted at 257). Yet, this source of knowledge – testimony on the basis of lived 
experience – has not been valued accordingly in academic communities. The proposal is that we 
should think carefully about the epistemic status of the empirical literature: for example, we might 
regard it as providing evidential support for, and thereby vindicating, the lived experiences of 
individuals who have long reported on this discrimination, whilst also reflecting on which norms 
dictate that such testimony requires 'vindicating'; rather than as evidence about newly discovered 
patterns of discrimination. Such a stance highlights the importance of attending to historically 
marginalised testimonies, and may help to avoid what Kristie Dotson (2012) has named 
'contributory injustice'. In a context where various conceptual resources – some marginalised – co-
exist, contributory injustice is the maintenance and deployment of structurally prejudiced and 
exclusionary hermeneutical resources. Whilst being able to articulate experiences via non-
mainstream hermeneutical resources, some speakers may fail to receive uptake for her testimony 
due to the impoverished resources of the hearer. 
 Feminist epistemology also offers us resources to account for why testimony has been 
ignored or marginalised. One might see the literature on implicit bias as filling a 'hermeneutical 
gap' (a notion developed in Fricker, 2007), and offering us conceptual resources that better enable 
discourse on discrimination and injustice to proceed.  Whilst the findings on implicit bias help us 
to correct that lack of interpretative resources, they also prompt reflection on how those findings 
are positioned in relation to other sources of evidence, and on the appropriate epistemic 
dispositions towards both empirical findings and heretofore marginalised narratives of social 
reality. 
                                                          
4 It is worth noting that this paper was not available in any of our university libraries, despite being reproduced in 
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